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in Italy
Cesare Bisoni, Andrea Ferrari, and Alessandro Giovanni Grasso
8.1 Introduction
The chapter investigates the way in which the approach taken to corpo-
rate banking, and the bank-company relationship, and the strong local 
roots retained even by the largest groups, all helped to reduce the risk 
of credit rationing for firms and improved credit risk management on 
lending to companies in Italy.
Within the bank-company relationship, the second part of the chap-
ter illustrates the nature of corporate and investment banking (CIB) in 
Italy, describing the way this sector is served by the country’s largest 
banks and outlining possible developments in the light of the recent 
financial crisis.
8.2 Lending to companies
In Italy, banks have always been the main source of external financing 
for companies, and especially for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs),1 which are constantly increasing in number due to a general fail-
ure to grow in size. The main reasons for this preference for bank finance 
are the low credit access threshold, the flexibility, and the speed with 
which loans are issued, the combination with payment services, the eas-
ier accessibility and lower cost compared to financing through securities, 
and the fundamentally “detached” approach of the bank, which does 
not interfere in the management of companies. This aspect is still very 
important for family-run companies, which continue to be an essential 
feature of the Italian industrial scene (Belli and Giordano 2007).
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Small and medium-sized enterprises, with informal governance 
models, generally use fairly simple forms of financing and in particu-
lar are suspicious of external equity. The resulting financial struc-
tures are based largely on debt, especially short-term borrowing, 
often supported by the entrepreneur’s personal assets, generating an 
undesirable confusion and a lack of transparency in creditworthi-
ness assessment. The fragility of firms’ financial structures leads to 
the inappropriate transfer of some of the company risk to the bank, 
which can only be overcome through closer links to the equity mar-
ket. Italian firms’ financial indebtedness in relation to gross domestic 
product (GDP) is growing constantly, reaching 84 per cent at the end 
of 2010; leverage has been over 40 per cent for some time, with a high 
proportion of short-term bank loans to financial debt (Banca d’Italia 
2011a).
Even before the start of the financial crisis, Italian companies 
showed more obvious signs of weakness than the European average: 
less ability to generate earnings from the core business, a high level of 
indebtedness in relation to both sales and equity, and a high incidence 
of financial costs (De Socio 2010). With the latest developments in 
the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Area, and in Italy above all, com-
panies’ financial fragility and vulnerability have become even more 
accentuated.
Table 8.1 highlights the undercapitalisation of small and medium-
sized enterprises and reveals that the weight of bank lending within 
their financial structure is constantly around 25 per cent, even exceed-
ing this value in some years. About three-quarters of debts to banks are 
short-term, although during 2009 there has been a partial shift towards 
medium- to long-term loans, generating improvements in financial 
stability.
Larger companies’ lower rates of indebtedness are compensated by 
higher net capital.
The many studies conducted over time by the Bank of Italy, by many 
academics, and by various industrialists’ associations have underlined 
the need to improve the bank–firm relationship, viewed as unsatisfac-
tory above all because it is often “transaction” rather than “relationship” 
based. The relationship is therefore rather short on mutual knowledge 
and understanding, which partly derives from the sharp separation 
between bank and company introduced by the 1936 banking law.
Companies’ tendency to engage in multibanking, leading to the frag-
mentation of their relationship with the banks, has always been consid-
ered emblematic of this situation.
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Table 8.1 Financing of Italian manufacturing firms, values as percentages of 
total liabilities
Small businesses (revenues lower than €10 million)
Year
Bank loan
EquityShort term Medium- to long-term Total 
1999 17.66 6.68 24.34 25.75
2000 17.75 6.88 24.63 26.47
2001 18.02 6.71 24.73 27.45
2002 17.82 7.05 24.87 26.67
2003 18.43 7.53 25.96 25.58
2004 18.07 7.89 25.96 26.02
2005 17.86 8.38 26.24 26.65
2006 18.40 8.56 26.96 26.05
2007 18.89 8.85 27.74 26.00
2008 18.09 7.98 26.07 32.43
2009 16.02 9.32 25.34 34.19
Medium-sized enterprises (revenues between €10–50 million)
Year
Bank loan
EquityShort term Medium- to long-term Total 
1999 18.42 7.02 25.44 26.26
2000 18.84 6.51 25.35 26.70
2001 18.81 6.53 25.34 27.52
2002 17.73 6.70 24.43 28.13
2003 17.40 7.26 24.66 29.16
2004 17.08 7.38 24.46 29.14
2005 16.51 7.83 24.34 29.89
2006 16.69 8.04 24.73 29.29
2007 17.81 8.32 26.13 29.02
2008 17.49 7.88 25.37 33.03
2009 15.65 8.62 24.27 36.11
Large corporate banks (revenues more than €50 million)
Year
Bank loan
EquityShort term Medium- to long-term Total 
1999 12.38 7.19 19.57 29.84
2000 12.26 6.59 18.85 31.07
2001 12.43 7.18 19.61 30.38
2002 11.02 6.58 17.60 31.22
2003 10.24 6.86 17.10 30.92
2004 9.17 6.03 15.20 32.71
2005 8.67 6.24 14.91 32.96
2006 9.11 6.09 15.20 33.47
2007 9.17 6.68 15.85 33.37
2008 9.93 6.37 16.30 34.22
2009 8.34 6.86 15.20 34.33
Source: Processing of BACH – Bank for the Accounts of Companies Harmonized.
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8.3 The practice of multibanking
Multibanking has been encouraged by wide variety of factors, 
including
from the banks’ side: by the lending timespan specialisation imposed  ●
by the 1936 banking law, which basically remained in force until 
1993;2 by the constraints with regard to risk concentration; by the 
small size of most of the banks, meaning that they were unable to 
completely satisfy the largest firms’ financial needs; and by the low 
margins on loans, which led to a preference for insurance-based risk 
management;
from the companies’ side: by the positive attitude to indebtedness  ●
encouraged by more favourable tax law and entrepreneurs/share-
holders’ strong propensity for a lack of transparency in their report-
ing, partly for fiscal reasons.
Pelliccioni and Torluccio (2007) attempted to identify the main reasons 
for the popularity of multibanking. Their study reveals that the number 
of banking relationships increases in direct proportion to company 
size, leverage, and the need for financial instruments other than those 
traditionally offered by banks. Multibanking decreases in step with lack 
of clarity in investments in research & development and investment 
in tangible fixed assets, and when economic and financial conditions 
improve.
Both banks and companies considered the practice of multibanking 
to be beneficial. From the bank’s point of view, multibanking reduces 
credit risk by sharing it across a large number of institutions, with a 
consequent limitation of the costs of information and creditworthiness 
assessment (often problematic due to the lack of transparency in infor-
mation), and makes it possible to stop financing the company further 
in the event that danger signals are noted, and to cancel the credit line 
if necessary. Companies view favourably the fact that they can trade 
their supplier banks off against each other and thus save on the cost of 
money, avoid revealing their real economic and financial situation to 
any of the banks, and protect themselves against the sudden cancella-
tion of credit lines, which may occur, especially at times of financial 
difficulty.
In reality, these benefits are more apparent than real. The fragmen-
tation of credit risk due to the spread of lending across a number of 
banks, and the strong weight assigned to collateral as a parameter for 
assessing the company’s solvency, discourage banks from acquiring 
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significant information about companies, weakening their role as selec-
tors of investment projects. The consequence may be that they lose a 
sense of responsibility, and tend to follow, as one author has aptly put it, 
a sort of “herd instinct” (Ciocca 1991). These types of inefficiency in the 
allocation of lending may be even more detrimental for the small and 
medium-sized enterprises with the best prospects for growth and profit-
ability. Furthermore, an approach based on limited mutual knowledge 
leads the bank to underestimate overall credit risk and to apply a higher 
spread across-the-board to cover higher losses on loans, not to perform 
creditworthiness assessment with the necessary professionalism and 
expertise, and thus to require higher collateral, behaving in the way 
companies have always criticised; it also prevents banks from providing 
companies with useful advice and recommendations.
For the company, multibanking implies sacrificing the opportunity 
of across-the-board financial advice from a single source and losing 
the chance of reducing overall costs by integrating the various services 
used. Moreover, empirical research has demonstrated that firms are less 
likely to suffer credit constraints when they do business with only a few 
banks (Guelpa and Tirri 2004).
Therefore, in general terms, the practice of multibanking creates a 
weak relationship between the bank and the firm, which, as we have 
already seen, tends to be transaction-based (Ruozi and Zara 2001) and 
multibanking discourages the establishment of relationships that last 
over time. A respected leading figure in the Bank of Italy summed up 
the problem in a nutshell years ago: “Firms rely on banks both too much 
and not enough” (Padoa-Schioppa 1995).
The multibanking approach is still very widespread, although there 
has been a gradual reduction in its prevalence in the last few years, 
hand in hand with an increase in the proportion of lending provided 
by the company’s chief bank.
Table 8.2 reveals that the average number of banks per borrower com-
pany fell between 1998 and 2010 from 2.96 to 2.51. The data by size cat-
egory of the total credit line granted reveals that this reduction, which 
has accelerated from 2006, is particularly noticeable for companies 
in the largest size classes, although they still do business with a large 
number of banks. This is no surprise, given that even companies with 
total access to credit of less than €1 million, and thus of small size, work 
with nearly three banks from 2005. Basically, progress in the reduction 
of the number of banks is in the right direction but is rather slow; there 
is still a long way to go towards the model in which one main bank 
satisfies the majority of the company’s financial needs.
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Table 8.3 shows that this is already the case for the smallest firms, 
while for those with access to credit of more than €1 million, the chief 
bank covers less than 60 per cent of their borrowing needs; this figure 
falls to around 40 and 30 per cent for companies in the two largest size 
categories. In any case, predominance from the point of view of the 
credit line granted is not in itself symptomatic of a satisfactory prefer-
ential relationship.
Therefore, on average Italian companies maintain relations with more 
banks, with a smaller proportion of their lending from their chief bank, 
than companies in other countries.
The reduction in multibanking that has occurred cannot be imputed 
only to the consolidation process that has taken place in the banking 
industry. It is partly due to the process of branch liberalisation. The 
reduction in the total number of banks has been accompanied by a sig-
nificant increase in the average number of banks operating in the local 
markets (Tarantola 2007). This increase has occurred above all in the 
markets where economic activity is most intense, and thus where the 
needs for financing to cover investment projects mainly arise. Therefore, 
the trend away from multibanking can also be interpreted as a growing 
awareness of the costs and risks of this practice (Cesarini 2003).
The weakness of bank-firm relationships based on multibanking is 
also confirmed by studies performed to examine its effects on credit 
availability in the specific context of the financial crisis. In particu-
lar, empirical findings reveal that “Firms which borrow from a larger 
number of banks experience lower credit growth, while firms with 
more concentrated credit experience higher credit growth.” (De Mitri 
et al. 2010).
Moreover, companies that borrow from many banks are also more 
likely to be credit-constrained. On the other hand, more concentrated 
lending with the main bank, with the latter providing a high propor-
tion of lending, reduces the probability of being asked to cut credit. The 
effects of the stability of the banking relationship are clear, since the 
relationship only becomes significant if it is of sufficiently long dura-
tion (De Mitri et al. 2010).
With the start of the crisis, there has been a great deal of discussion 
as to the degree of credit constraint firms may have suffered from, and 
this has highlighted a controversial aspect of the bank-company rela-
tionship. More rigid lending criteria and an increase in the number of 
firms having difficulty in accessing bank loans are typical of recessions 
and arise from a deterioration in the quality of loans. However, since 
the crisis had a number of causes, it is not possible to establish whether 
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and to what extent the credit squeeze that undoubtedly occurred during 
the period was due to demand-side factors or to a supply-side shortage. 
Similarly, it is not possible to state beyond doubt whether the reduction 
in the availability of loans was due, even partially, to decisions and 
constraints within the banking system. During 2011, the raising of the 
bar noted in the criteria for lending to companies appears to be directly 
linked to banks’ liquidity situation and funding difficulties, as a conse-
quence of the tensions surrounding Italy’s sovereign debt.
However, with regard to the existence and extent of constraints on 
lending to companies, the findings of questionnaire surveys conducted 
regularly by Osservatorio UniCredit have been available for some time, 
and thus also cover periods prior to the crisis.3 Their results provide 
information about small firms’ perception of the degree of rationing 
suffered before and after the peak of the crisis. A comparison between 
the replies provided during the two years covered by the survey, 2008 
and 2009, indicates that, while there was a clear increase (from 26.7 per 
cent to 44.4 per cent) in the number of firms that would have liked to 
obtain more loans (weak rationing), the number that would have been 
unable to obtain loans even if they had been prepared to pay a higher 
interest rate (strong rationing) was 5.0 per cent for 2008 and 7.6 per 
cent for 2009. The data indicate only a fairly limited rise in the level 
of rationing. If the comparison is extended to the pre-crisis period, the 
proportion of companies that feel credit-constrained, although signifi-
cant,4 is sharply below the level for 2008 and 2009.
With the onset of the crisis, there was also a marked deterioration in 
the quality of the loans granted. Bad debts (loans granted to borrowers 
who are insolvent or are in basically equivalent situations, regardless of 
collateral), which accounted for 3.11 per cent of the total loans granted 
in December 2007, had risen to 5.40 per cent in March 2012.
If measured on the basis of impaired loans, meaning not only bad 
debts but also loans to subjects in temporary financial difficulty,5 the 
quality of loans is very low, and is constantly deteriorating. Compared 
to December 2008, the number of impaired loans as of March 2012 
(Banca d’Italia, Bollettino statistico, various years) had doubled, from 
5.11 per cent to 11.62 per cent of total loans.
8.4 The process of change within the banking system
During the last twenty years, especially due to the introduction of 
the Consolidated Law on Banking of 1993, the Italian banking sys-
tem has undergone deep-seated change involving the main factors 
Corporate and Investment Banking 149
influencing the bank-firm relationship, which has led banks to rethink 
their approach in this area. The following are particularly significant:
consolidation within the banking system, which has involved a large  ●
number of banks of all sizes and has caused major changes in market 
shares, also benefiting the “independent” banks, i.e., mutual banks 
and banks that do not belong to groups (Tarantola 2008);
the inclusion of efficiency amongst the aims of supervisory policy,  ●
which has generated changes in banks’ culture and governance;
the despecialisation of intermediaries in terms of areas of business  ●
and lending time-scales, the introduction of the universal bank and 
the consequent opening-out of operating possibilities;
the growth of competition and the increasing specialisation of the  ●
financial system, which have led banks to prioritise “relationships” 
and thus to introduce loyalty-creation strategies based on the deliv-
ery of customised services rather than strategies for increasing client 
numbers through price alone;
the evolution of banks’ organisational models, partly as a result of the  ●
many M&A operations, which has increased the capability for meet-
ing firms’ needs by means of a broad, complete product offering.
The changes outlined above have created favourable conditions for the 
improvement of the quality of the bank-firm relationship. In fact:
Banks are free to target their policies, and, although with variations  ●
within the system, they have developed an entrepreneurial approach 
to the market, offering a full, diversified service. Therefore, the rela-
tionship with firms is able to become deeper and more complex and 
can be fulfilled through new operating procedures. Basically, the 
conventional lending function can now form part of a complete, 
integrated assistance and advisory service.
Firms are showing signs of paying more and more attention to their  ●
relationships with banks and the opportunities offered by the finan-
cial markets. They tend to classify banks’ offerings on the basis of 
their ability to satisfy specific needs that arise, and they appear 
to be tending to rationalise the number of their banking relation-
ships, reducing their degree of multibanking, the supposed benefits 
of which now seem to be less clear. Many well-run companies have 
already introduced measures to restructure their relationships with 
the banking system and to attempt to established closer relation-
ships with individual banks.
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8.5 From the Consolidated Law on Banking to Basel II: 
Implications for the bank–company relationship
In Italy, there has always been a tight bond between small and medium-
sized enterprises and the local banks, whose main strength lies in their 
local roots, which allow them to maintain close relationships with the 
local economy and community; the absence of geographical separation 
between the bank’s top management and the clientele; and their greater 
willingness to support firms in hard economic times.
These banks have always placed their dealings with small and 
medium-sized enterprises on a relational footing. This is due to the 
characteristics of firms of this kind, in terms of both ownership struc-
ture and financial management, since their level of capitalisation is low 
and the processes by which they analyse and plan their financial needs 
tend to be rudimentary.
If this model of relationship, which includes the positive features 
mentioned above, is not to produce adverse effects, the bank must 
retain its own independent capacity to assess a firm’s creditworthiness, 
ensuring that the personal acquaintanceship with the firm’s owner that 
has developed and has been consolidated over time does not lead to 
decisions inconsistent with the degree of risk considered acceptable, 
especially in situations where the company’s continuity and survival 
may depend on increased access to credit. In this area, organisational 
decisions and considerations with regard to the degree of mobility of 
branch managers are significant; keeping staff in one place for a long 
time aids the acquisition of soft information, but on the other it may 
lead to information asymmetries with the bank’s central management.
The basic aim of Basel II was to foster a culture of risk awareness 
amongst banks and to create a direct link between levels of capitali-
sation and the degree of risk actually undertaken, increasing man-
agement’s involvement and sense of responsibility in this area (De 
Laurentis and Caselli 2004). For banks capable of implementing proper, 
effective risk management methods, this should lead to a reduction in 
costs, enabling banks to charge lower prices to their best corporate cus-
tomers, and in particular to those capable of providing, in a transpar-
ent, standardised form, current and budget information useful for the 
accurate assessment of their economic and financial stability and thus 
of their creditworthiness. In any case it is possible to establish a clearer 
link than in the past between the price of loans and the risk undertaken 
by the bank, also benefiting small and medium-sized enterprises, often 
penalised by their lack of bargaining power (Tarantola 2008).
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Basel II encourages banks to introduce more structured lending proc-
esses, greater standardisation and formalisation of information, and 
a different sequence of phases in their creditworthiness assessment 
procedures.
The problems lie, on the one hand, in smaller-sized firms’ inability 
and/or unwillingness to provide the bank with correct, transparent 
information in a standardised form, often due to their lack of a prop-
erly developed financial function, and on the other, in the difficulty 
of incorporating soft information, and subjective information above 
all, in models. Soft information is the type most subject to informa-
tion asymmetries and is the most difficult type for the relationship’s 
manager to assess and interpret, but it is often the most crucial form of 
information because it reflects the most important, distinctive aspects 
of the company’s business.
Assessing the creditworthiness of small and medium-sized enterprises 
is problematical as a result of their undercapitalisation, poor returns, 
and consequent low investment capabilities; the use of the entrepre-
neur’s own assets as collateral is often fundamental to the granting of 
a loan. In cases of this kind, qualitative information is of major impor-
tance (Mieli 2009).
Apart from causing the loss of valuable information available to the 
client manager (often the branch manager), the problems of giving due 
weight to the soft information in the evaluatuion process may result in 
significant changes in bank-firm relationship, including on the avail-
ability and cost of credit, something that like many representatives of 
the business community complain. It is worth focusing attention on 
this topic because it may have negative consequences for the relation-
ship between the bank and the customer firm and its potential develop-
ment; in general terms, it may delay or even prevent the transition from 
the transaction to the relationship banking model (Cosma 2002).
The use of soft information for the purposes of credit risk assessment 
is easier where the distance between the bank’s decision-making centres 
and the firm’s geographical location is small, because an appreciation of 
specific features of the local economic and sociocultural context is fun-
damental for the correct interpretation and exploitation of information 
of this kind (Cosma et al. 2003). This points to a potential competitive 
advantage for local banks over large intermediaries, especially when 
the organisational model chosen by the latter is divisional by areas 
of business, which may cause fragmentation of the relationship with 
the customer-enterpreneur. This may explain the strategies adopted 
by some large banks, and especially those created by merger processes 
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involving local banks, which have reviewed past decisions with regard 
to the localisation of lending decision-making centres and shortened 
the decision-making process (Albareto et al. 2008), handing a major role 
back to outlying offices, with the added advantage of reducing informa-
tion transfer costs and the length of time needed to respond to custom-
ers’ requests. These decisions have also been triggered by the erosion of 
the shares of the small and medium-sized enterprise market segment 
suffered by the large banks during the last few years,6 which might be 
explained by these companies’ preference for the relational approach 
(Bonaccorsi di Patti et al. 2005).
The negative impact on relations with small and medium-sized enter-
prises, especially with regard to the proportion of lending allocated to 
them, was less in cases in which growth was achieved during acquisi-
tion processes that kept the local target bank in operation, meaning 
that the benefits of geographical roots, in information and other terms, 
were not lost (Beretta and Del Prete 2007). It should also be mentioned 
that thanks to the development of information technology (IT), it is 
now possible to process a large proportion of soft information, reducing 
the large banks’ competitive disadvantage in relations with small and 
medium-sized enterprises compared to their smaller counterparts.
A sample survey conducted by the Bank of Italy and involving more 
than 300 banks reports an acceleration in the introduction of quanti-
tative models for the assessment of creditworthiness, even for smaller 
firms, in smaller-sized banks; in 2006 about 60 per cent of these banks 
applied the new methods to their lending decisions and to the calcu-
lation of credit lines and collateral requirements. However, it should 
be underlined that only 18 per cent of the banks in the sample con-
sidered these tools of key importance, and virtually the only factors 
considered were financial statement data and current borrower status 
(Albareto et al. 2008), confirming the difficulty of completely includ-
ing soft information and the amount of work still to be done before it 
becomes possible to assign the right weight to qualitative information 
which, if overlooked, could lead to the rationing of credit or unneces-
sary increases in the costs applied (Tarantola 2007).
Qualitative information can be acquired and used more easily and 
with less complexity by smaller banks in view of their nearness to the 
customer. Under Basel II, the clientele of small and medium-sized enter-
prises enjoy favourable treatment: for banks that use internal ratings, 
loans granted to them require capital coverage up to 50 per cent lower 
than those granted to large corporations, which are considered more 
exposed to economic cycle risks (Mieli 2009).
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In spite of this, with the onset of the financial crisis firms have faced 
tougher lending terms, and in their perception the banks’ changed 
behaviour is due not only to the different economic context but also to 
the application of the Basel II rules. Although really the outcome of the 
increased credit risk, difficulties in accessing credit have been attrib-
uted to the new rules.
Banks appear to make little use of the override mechanism envisaged 
by the regulations to ensure that rating systems are flexible and up to 
date, mainly because of risk managers’ unwillingness to take responsi-
bility for using it. This instrument, where the necessary conditions are 
met, allows the bank to make effective use of the information available 
to it and increase its lending efficiency (Mieli 2009).
De Angeli et al. (2007) reveal that small enterprises believe that they 
have not received sufficient information about the rating process and 
its underlying principles, and thus about the factors that affect the rat-
ing assigned; in their view, this prevents them from taking action to 
ensure that they are assessed more accurately. Moreover, there is still a 
widespread conviction that the banks assign great importance to eco-
nomic and financial information in their lending decisions, and do 
not pay due attention to qualitative information. Last but not least, 
although they realise there are benefits in establishing closer relations 
with one or just a few banks, many small firms hesitate to reduce their 
number of banking relationships because they are afraid that this may 
lead to a reduction in the financial resources to which they have access, 
and they still believe it is advantageous to trade banks off against each 
other. This may also be due to the belief that obtaining bank loans has 
become more difficult as a consequence of the transition to Basel II.
8.6 Towards a new bank–firm relationship
If the bank-firm relationship is to be improved, banks need to continue 
resolutely with the changes implemented in the last few years, above 
all by extending their knowledge of the firm and the sector in which 
it works.
This implies making an assessment of the firm that includes an anal-
ysis of its competitive position in its sector, verification that the critical 
factors for success are available, forecasting the cash flows associated 
with investment projects, and identifying the characteristics of finan-
cial needs, essential for choosing the appropriate mix of financing.
An approach of this kind conflicts with the practice of multibank-
ing but is compatible with the use of a single bank of reference, which 
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knows the company and is capable of supplying a broad range of finan-
cial services, aiming to achieve a return not on the individual operation 
but on the relationship overall.
The bank must have suitable technologies and professional compe-
tences, together with an organisational structure that facilitates con-
tact with the company, the acquisition of the necessary information on 
investment projects and on the business as a whole, and correct, swift 
lending decision-making. The principles on which the bank organises 
the division and coordination of work in this sector affects the qual-
ity of the credit-offering process and its ability to select and support 
deserving projects.
The degree of development and formalisation of the financial func-
tion has a major impact on firms’ ability to communicate their objec-
tives and financial needs to the bank and helps to improve the quality 
of the relationship (Ruozi and Zara 2001).
Another important factor is the bank’s ability to support the com-
pany’s growth by organising integrated financial service packages and 
offering professional advisory services that assist the firm in making 
fully informed decisions, especially with regard to harmonising the 
characteristics of financial needs and the instruments used to cover 
them, in line with strategic objectives. This aspect, which still appears 
to receive too little attention (Bentivogli et al. 2007; De Angeli et al. 
2007), is particularly problematical for small banks, which have tradi-
tionally concentrated on lending but may lose their role of main bank 
if they are unable to adapt their offering to the changed needs of the 
core clientele. The problem can only be partially resolved through the 
development within groups or categories of banks of forms of collabora-
tion with larger-sized intermediaries, from which the products required 
by the clientele can be purchased.
Last but not least, banks can provide a major contribution to strength-
ening the financial structures of even small-sized firms with growth 
potential, by assisting their entry onto the equity market.
Venture capital and private equity can also be useful tools for diversi-
fying SMEs’ sourcing of finance, with the aim of maintaining leverage 
at an acceptable level in terms of risk and the cost of finance. Moreover, 
these forms of investment may enable the firm to grow its management 
expertise, because the financing project generally involves involvement 
in the management of the firm, which may be particularly useful in 
growth phases, and may help to reduce information asymmetries in rela-
tion to the market. The underdeveloped state of these markets not only 
constitutes a gap in the Italian financial system, but also discourages 
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the stock market listing of companies, already viewed with suspicion 
by many entrepreneurs, who are afraid of losing control of their busi-
nesses. Moreover listing is considered problematic due to the costs and 
the organisational and corporate structural changes required by the 
current regulations. Companies’ failure to list on the stock exchange 
reduces the ability of venture capital and private equity operators to 
make funding available, which discourages investment.
In addition, banks’ support in obtaining funds from equity markets 
not only assists companies’ growth, but also extends the intermedi-
ary’s knowledge of its client, the importance of which has already been 
underlined above.
However, for the banking system to make the necessary contribution 
to strengthening firms’ financial structures, the latter must become 
more willing to accept the bank as a partner, interested in both the 
success of business and in the inclusion of new shareholders when it 
becomes necessary to increase its risk capital, overcoming the typical 
fears of Italian entrepreneurs. It is also essential for the bank not to 
exploit the dominant position acquired in relation to the firm solely to 
its own advantage, and to reinforce the relationship and the loyalty of 
the customer firm by its behaviour.
The above comments clearly reveal that, in spite of the progress made 
in recent years, there is still room for improvement in the bank-firm 
relationship, which must constantly adapt to changes in the factors that 
influence it.
First and foremost, both parties must make a great effort to change 
their mindsets, essential for the transition from what is often an antag-
onistic relationship to one of open collaboration based on mutual trust, 
which may allow the bank to support good business ventures even in 
unfavourable economic contexts. This process is definitely under way, 
and it has recently accelerated, but it is important to be aware that there 
are wide variations, especially between different parts of the country, 
and rapid progress is required.
An improvement of the professional competences of the people work-
ing within both banks and firms is also necessary; the lion’s share of 
responsibility in this area lies with the banks, in view of their tradi-
tion and of the experience they have acquired over the years. What is 
required is progress in the direction many banks have been following 
for some time, with an increase of the number of people, within their 
organisations and above all in the points of contact with the clientele 
of staff, who are capable of managing highly specialised demand with a 
strong degree of personalisation.
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Finally, firms, and especially small and medium-sized enterprises, 
must equip themselves to extend their knowledge of their economic 
and financial situation and its expected evolution. This would benefit 
their management and would enable them to provide the bank with the 
information needed for an objective reliable evaluation of their credit-
worthiness and for monitoring of the relationship on a regular, stand-
ardized basis. Furthermore, firms’ adoption of formal governance and 
control models would also win them easier access to external finance, 
essential for the support of growth processes and for reducing their 
capital costs.
In conclusion, greater cooperation between the two sides is required, 
based on transparency; willingness on the part of firms to provide 
banks with the quantitative and qualitative information necessary for 
familiarity with their situation and characteristics; the full, correct use 
of this information by banks in the creditworthiness assessment pro-
cedure and in the choice of financing services and their pricing; and a 
durable relationship.
8.7 The development of the corporate and investment 
banking business
The positive development of the bank-firm relationship involves the 
evolution not only of corporate lending, but also of corporate and 
investment banking services.
The term “investment banking” normally refers to a combination of 
products and services designed to satisfy a wide range of complex finan-
cial needs, which are different from the ordinary financing require-
ments of the firm’s business operations.
The corporate and investment banking services area may offer con-
crete solutions to a variety of requirements. Financing for growth strat-
egies that represent a major break with the past; access to the equity 
market; management of generational changeovers; optimisation of debt 
structure; reconfiguration of the core business; and plans for ownership 
restructuring or the entry of new financial investors are all examples. 
These services satisfy needs shared by all firms, needs whose intensity 
and nature vary depending on the firms’ size, sector of business, life 
cycle phase, ownership structure, and governance model.
Moreover, the complexity of the needs served means that the solu-
tions offered by intermediaries must be equally complex in terms of 
know-how, production processes, technical-contractual profiles, and 
pricing models. Therefore, the survey of corporate and investment 
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services gives separate consideration to the various areas of business: 
capital markets, corporate finance, merchant banking, project finance, 
asset management, and risk management. It is not necessarily the case 
that all these areas must or can be effectively covered within the organi-
sation of a single financial intermediary (Capizzi 2007).
The 1990s saw the introduction of processes intended to extend the 
range of services offered to firms. Interest in this business sector devel-
oped mainly within the banking system and to a much lesser extent 
amongst specialist and specific financial service companies. This is 
due above all to the process of diversification of areas of business that 
affected banks during this period and the largely marginal role of spe-
cialist financial intermediaries in the Italian context. In contrast to the 
situation in the United States and the United Kingdom, banks in Italy 
became the focal point for the development of CIB services.
The characteristics of the financial system, focused more on interme-
diaries than on markets, meant that in Italy CIB was on a smaller scale 
than in other financial contexts such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, and Germany. Some figures will provide a clearer 
understanding of the context. At the end of 2010, Italy had only 332 
companies listed on the stock exchange, compared to 639 in France, 
765 in Germany, and 2,603 in the United Kingdom. In terms of break-
down by industry, two-thirds of the value of the Italian stock market 
were represented by just 10 corporations, operating in the financial, oil 
and public utilities industries, and there were very few listed firms in 
the most high-tech, innovative sectors. Considering the 10 initial pub-
lic offerings and 18 rights issues during the year, in 2010 the equity seg-
ment of the capital market attracted investments of €10 billion, 25 per 
cent of which referred to just one operation. The most important part 
of the entire Italian capital market is thus the bond segment, with €713 
billion. The corporate sector accounts for just 4 per cent of this total, 
and here again it is extremely concentrated, with 50 per cent of the 
funds invested received by just four issuers. Therefore, in general the 
corporate segment features low volumes and very few issuers, reflecting 
the fact that only a small number of large-sized firms use the financial 
markets as a source of capital.
The nature of the entrepreneurial fabric and the financial system thus 
underlie the characteristics of the supply and demand for corporate 
finance and investment banking services in Italy. The distinctive fea-
tures of Italian industry are the large number of small-sized enterprises 
(Eurostat 2011), the centrality of family-based capitalism (Amatori et al. 
2011), and the predominance of owner-management (Brandolini and 
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Bugamelli 2009), which leads to a lack of distinction between the assets 
of the family and those of the firm, problematical when complex eco-
nomic variables have to be managed.
Firms’ size and governance models influence their financial strate-
gies. Several studies of the Italian situation (Caselli 2001; Cenni 2006; 
Caselli and Gatti 2005; Caruso and Palmucci 2008) have demonstrated 
a high degree of correlation between the services requested and corpo-
rate dimensions. The range of financing services used by small firms in 
particular is very limited, and as the first section of this chapter makes 
clear, bank lending is the method of choice. In line with the pecking 
order theory, Italian firms’ financial preferences start with the least 
complex and expensive option in terms of organisation and relation-
ships, and they rarely make use of sources of financing (whether risk 
capital or lending) requiring greater openness to the outside in terms 
of information.
The demand for CIB can be clearly subdivided by firm size. SMEs are 
apparently largely excluded from access to the capital markets, in spite 
of the launch of segments specifically intended for them, such as the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM), both for cultural reasons and due 
to volume factors. They are therefore more interested in advisory and 
merchant banking than in underwriting services. On the other hand, 
large corporations are potentially interested in the entire range of CIB 
products and services.
As well as demand, the supply of corporate and investment bank-
ing services is also affected by the regulatory framework, which affects 
operators’ strategic choices. This market has developed in Italy more 
recently than in other contexts, and it is smaller due to the regulatory 
framework of the financial sector and the state’s involvement in the 
economy, arising from the financial crisis of the 1930s. Although it did 
not create legal impediments to the securities industry, the inspiring 
principle of Italy’s 1936 banking law, which remained in force for more 
than half a century, was to prevent commercial banks from making 
direct investments in corporate equity. The experience of the crisis that 
hit the universal banks in the 1930s led to the fear that any long-term 
financial support, whether in the form of lending or equity invest-
ments, might make commercial banks’ solvency too closely dependent 
on that of its customer corporations. The consequent strict distinction 
in operating time-scales and types of business between banks and spe-
cial credit institutions survived until the 1990s.
It was not until the implementation of European Union (EU) leg-
islation that a number of independent investment banks and the 
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commercial banks started to extend their operations to include the 
provision of financial assistance to firms. The period from the 1990s 
onwards has seen a number of changes with regard to investment bank-
ing and private equity on the Italian market; in particular, commercial 
banks have shown a decided interest in the investment banking sec-
tor. This has led to acquisitions of investment banks that originated 
from strategic motives regarding the cross-selling of services and the 
internalisation of higher-margin earnings. Acquisitions have involved 
both investment banks and specialist merchant banks.7 This process 
was encouraged by the reduction in margins on the traditional lending 
business, as well as by the new regulatory approach.
Another factor that helps to explain firms’ preference for lending as 
a source of finance derives from fiscal regulations. In Italy, this has 
historically not been neutral in relation to corporate finance strate-
gies, favouring the financing of investments through indebtedness over 
the use of equity. The interest paid on loans can be deducted from the 
company’s taxable income, while the financial costs of risk capital can-
not; moreover, returns on risk capital are subject to higher taxation 
than those on capital used for lending. This fiscal favouritism has been 
reduced but not eliminated over the years.
8.8 The structure of the supply of corporate and 
investment banking services
In Italy, the corporate and investment banking services market is occu-
pied by domestic and foreign operators, with a variety of organisational 
types: the investment banking units of the large banking groups, the 
few remaining pure investment banks,8 and the many financial advi-
sory firms.
The foreign operators9 cover large geographical areas, offer a wide 
variety of products, and serve a large number of types of customer. Their 
main clientele consists of large or medium-large corporations, since the 
resources available for the Italian market and the budget targets set by 
central managements make the middle market less profitable. Some 
operations are handled directly by teams working in Italy, while par-
ticularly complex transactions requiring large amounts of funding are 
referred to central offices.10
Domestic operators subdivide into two categories: banking and 
non-banking. The banking operators include international groups: 
UniCredit and Intesa Sanpaolo, which at the end of 2010 held 32.9 
per cent of the system’s assets, (Banca d’Italia 2011a) and Mediobanca. 
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From the operating point of view, UniCredit and Intesa Sanpaolo can 
be defined as commercial banks that engage in investment banking; 
Mediobanca, the intermediary closest to the United States’ or United 
Kingdom’s investment bank model, is historically the most important 
institution on the Italian corporate and investment banking scene, and 
since 2003 it has followed a policy that has made it into an investment 
bank that engages in commercial banking business. These organisa-
tions hold large shares of the domestic market and offer a very wide 
variety of services that place them in direct competition with foreign 
banks.
There are also banking groups operating only at the domestic and 
local level, such as Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banco Popolare, and UBI 
Banca, with 18.9 per cent of the system’s assets. These three institu-
tions offer products comparable with those of the main players; smaller 
banks may even not offer products in this category at all, by reason of 
the type of clientele served.
As well as the banks, the sector is also served by a wide variety of 
other organisations, such as professional firms, financial intermediar-
ies, and securities firms, which all together produce the usual assort-
ment of CIB services.
An examination of the business model of the top five banking groups 
listed above and Mediobanca highlights some significant factors: the 
organisational model adopted, the type of service offered, the clientele 
segmentation, the depth and breadth of the service, and the degree of 
internationalisation.
An analysis of the business model of the main Italian operators, based 
on the model of the multifunctional group that provides investment 
banking functions within its organisation, reveals a number of major 
differences compared to the wholesale/broker-dealer model generally 
found in the United States and United Kingdom. The latter model has 
a number of key features (Scardovi 2009): a high level of financial lev-
erage; widespread use of maturity transformation, leading to a rise in 
liquidity risk if the rate of portfolio rotation slows due to unfavourable 
conditions on the financial markets; use of the financial markets as the 
main source of funding; and a cyclic trend in asset management and 
proprietary trading business, with an absence of profit stabilisation. 
As a result of the liquidity crisis associated with the recent financial 
crisis, the panorama of big investment banks has undergone profound 
changes since 2007.11
Most Italian operators, including the largest players, adopted an 
approach that integrates their lending, advisory, and capital market 
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activities. Wholesale lending is financed with the deposits of the retail 
clientele, a source of funding that is less expensive and more stable for 
the borrower (Banca d’Italia 2011a) and thus allows the relative degree 
of liquidity risk to be reduced for a given level of investments. The level 
of leverage is generally lower than that of international players, even in 
the case of Mediobanca.12
Here it is of interest to trace the story of Mediobanca, which was 
founded just after the Second World War to serve the medium-term 
needs of industrial enterprises and to establish a direct relationship 
between savers and the finance needed to restore companies’ produc-
tion operations. It eventually became Italy’s leading investment bank. 
Since 2003, Mediobanca has also diversified its operations towards retail 
banking, especially the acquisition of deposits from savers, to expand 
its access to “quality” sources of funding that are less expensive and 
considered more stable.
From the institutional point of view, the way banks choose to locate 
the lines of business that make up the corporate and investment areas 
within their organisations varies. Banks’ organisational strategies favour 
divisional or group models, with a greater (divisional) or lesser(group) 
degree of centralisation of the structure respectively. UniCredit and 
Intesa Sanpaolo are divisionalised groups, while Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena, Banco Popolare, and UBI Banca have adopted federal models. 
Mediobanca is in a category of its own due to its origins as an invest-
ment bank. Intesa Sanpaolo and UniCredit manage their corporate and 
investment banking business through a special division, which includes 
both the interface with corporate customers and product specialists. 
The service model is based mainly on the synergy between the network 
of relationship managers, who interact with companies, and whose task 
it is to respond to and identify their financial needs, and the product 
specialists who select, design, and adapt the most suitable instruments 
for them. In both cases, the coverage network fulfills a number of dif-
ferent functions: 1) management of the complete relationship with the 
customer corporation under a unified, global approach; 2) provision 
of a contact point to which the corporation can turn with its finan-
cial needs; 3) activation of the product specialists when appropriate. 
Basically, the territorial network acts as originator, turning as appro-
priate to the various teams of specialists, who operate within external 
companies with a high degree of independence. Intesa Sanpaolo has 
placed these specialist competences in a bank dedicated totally to this 
area of business, while UniCredit groups its product specialists together 
in product lines, specific units within the division.
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Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banco Popolare, and UBI Banca have 
adopted a similar model but with separation between the coverage 
and product networks. Coverage is provided by the group’s member 
banks, which retain independence and visibility by reason of their dis-
tribution networks. Within these banks, specific business centres are 
assigned to the provision of coverage for investment banking. On the 
other hand, product specialist functions are organised within totally 
dedicated banks. Differences emerge with regard to the activities under-
taken by these specialist entities. In the case of Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena, the specialist bank delivers services to the group, while in that 
of UBI Banca, the specialist bank both functions as product specialist 
for the group and supplies coverage in relation to large corporate and 
institutional customers, which it handles directly. The Banco Popolare 
specialist organisation is different again, since it also operates in the 
areas of investment and private banking. This arises from the fact that 
the customer base consists largely of small and medium-sized enter-
prises, where the distinction between the entrepreneur and his business 
is extremely blurred; therefore, the bank has integrated its corporate 
and family businesses to offer entrepreneur families a single contact, 
for both the routine and the extraordinary needs arising within the 
management of their business and private affairs.
As already mentioned, Mediobanca is the Italian bank closest to the 
US and UK investment bank model. Over time, the frontiers of its opera-
tions have been expanded, and simultaneously its organisational model 
has evolved, to the point where it now comprises three business areas: 
corporate and investment banking, also including the wholesale bank-
ing and financial leasing businesses; principal investing, managing the 
portfolio of long-term investments in firms and the merchant banking 
and private equity portfolios; and retail and private banking, compris-
ing consumer credit, retail banking (with the primary aim of acquiring 
deposits), and private banking. The organisational structure is that of a 
group, which does not include any specific firms in the CIB area (except 
for the asset management side of private equity, managed by a separate 
company), but rather uses teams of specialists. The retail and private 
banking business areas, on the other hand, are covered by specific com-
panies directly responsible for both coverage and production.
8.9 Corporate and investment banking business areas
Exactly which services are included in the corporate and investment 
banking area depends on the definition of investment banking used 
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(Kuhn 1990; Iannotta 2010; Brigham and Ehrhardt 2011; Fleuriet 2008). 
There is no single, universally accepted criterion for setting the bound-
aries of this area of operations. Various studies have made a detailed 
examination of how the relevant services should be identified, but 
no single view emerges from the literature on the subject. At the two 
extremes there are one restrictive and one broad definition. The former 
derives from the historic model of underwriting on the primary mar-
ket and trading on the secondary market and excludes all the other 
areas of activities, including advisory services in merger and acquisition 
processes. The broad definition, on the other hand, reflects the evolu-
tion of the business of banks in this sector and includes a varied array 
of services: as well as underwriting and trading activities, it comprises 
merchant banking, asset management, advisory services in merger and 
acquisition or restructuring operations and risk management activities, 
through to lending. Between these two extremes there are other defi-
nitions, which may exclude asset management, lending, risk manage-
ment or merchant banking, considering them not to be intrinsic to the 
investment banking business.
According to a broad definition, CIB services can be subdivided into 
the following business areas (Liaw 2011; Capizzi 2007):
investment banking in the strict sense ●
corporate finance services ●
structured finance ●
merchant banking ●
risk management ●
Investment banking in the strictest sense relates to access to capital 
markets through operations in the primary market. The service is based 
on a process comprising four phases: origination, advisory, arranging, 
and distribution. In view of the economies of scale that can be gener-
ated, secondary market trading is often included in this area of busi-
ness, although the services are kept separate.
The corporate finance services area covers a combination of vari-
ous services intended to optimise the financial strategies of customer 
corporations and has strong advisory connotations. Here again, the 
process can be subdivided, this time into three phases: origination, 
advisory, and fund raising. Fund raising refers to the sourcing of the 
funds needed to complete the operation and often involves the organi-
sation of syndicated loans. Corporate finance services provide support 
for extraordinary financial operations, relating to the acquisition of 
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other companies, or conversely, to corporate sales and restructuring 
processes.
Structured finance involves the organisation of operations based on 
cash flows derived from assets or from investment projects separate 
from the company’s core business, handled through special purpose 
vehicles (SPVs). The process subdivides into four phases: origination, 
advisory, arranging, and fund raising. Project finance, securitisation, 
and leveraged finance operations fall within this category.
Merchant banking operations involve the acquisition of equity hold-
ings in non-financial companies by the financial operator. This is 
not strictly speaking a corporate banking service, since the package is 
acquired not by a customer but by the bank itself. It can, however, be 
defined as an asset management service if the funds used do not belong 
to the bank but are managed under a specific mandate.
In the CIB services, the risk management business area is the most 
recent and can be subdivided into two segments: the supply of products 
and services for the management of the risks of corporate customers, 
and the research and development of risk measurement and manage-
ment models.
From the operational point of view, the distinction in the above busi-
ness areas is less clear, since the teams assigned to these services often 
operate transversely and not just vertically, depending on whether 
fund raising or advisory services are involved. For example, within 
an extraordinary financial operation, funding may be handled by the 
structured finance team, working alongside the team from the corpo-
rate finance area.
In terms of the services offered, the sample consists of the top five 
banking group and Mediobanca, appears to be more uniform. The only 
exception is UniCredit, which has cut back its merchant banking busi-
ness to virtually nil. With regard to all the other services, the banks 
studied declare that they cover all corporate and investment banking 
services in the broad sense.
However, the importance of each individual area of business within 
the total volume handled, and the depth of the service offered, vary 
from bank to bank, depending in particular on the geographical area 
covered and the clientele served.
In the case of the commercial banks, it is interesting to note the 
size thresholds into which the business is subdivided, which indi-
cates the orientation towards and importance of relationship bank-
ing. Table 8.4 illustrates the situation in 2011. Naturally, the levels 
of the thresholds and the number of segments depend on the port-
folios of companies served. In general, the definition of these is still 
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ongoing; some banks (Intesa Sanpaolo and UniCredit) have revised 
their categories, while for others the revision in currently underway. 
Intesa Sanpaolo and UniCredit have the largest, most varied corpo-
rate customer portfolios and have proceeded in two stages. First, they 
excluded small firms from the market of reference by introducing a 
minimum threshold for access to this type of service, and they estab-
lished corporate centres, branches specialising in handling relations 
with corporate clientele. In the second phase, they redistributed the 
clientele by introducing a distinction between large corporate and 
corporate customers, setting new quantity thresholds with a higher 
access threshold and assigning customers to specific coverage facili-
ties: corporate centres and business centres. The customer bases of 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banco Popolare, and UBI Banca consist 
largely of SMEs. These banks also initially set an access threshold 
and redistributed the companies above it, but they have only recently 
announced that they intend to rationalise their organisation, raising 
the threshold for access to corporate banking services and reallocat-
ing firms amongst the specialist facilities.
Basically, by raising the threshold for access to corporate and invest-
ment banking services, Italian banks are creating conditions that will 
enable them to strengthen the figure of the client manager, through the 
greater concentration of resources in a more uniform customer portfo-
lio. The client manager is the key figure, since he acts as the contact 
for the user’s needs, facilitating the relationship with the organisation, 
especially when the service required is complex and a large number of 
functions have to be involved.
Several significant differences emerge from the breadth and depth of 
the range of CIB services. Intesa Sanpaolo, UniCredit, and Mediobanca 
are revealed to be universal banks, capable of providing clientele with 
assistance in all phases.
Table 8.4 Segmentation thresholds of banks, in millions of euros, 
2011
Bank SME
Corporate
Mid Large
Intesa Sanpaolo €2.5–150 €150–500 >€500 
UniCredit €3–50 €50–250 >€250 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena €0–5 €5–200 >€200 
Banco Popolare €0–5 €5 
UBI Banca €3–15 €15–250 >€250
Source: Processing of corporate data (various years).
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In the case of merger and acquisition operations, market scouting and 
feasibility studies are carried out in the preliminary phase, moving on 
to the analytical due diligence procedure and financial structuring and 
optimisation, through to the negotiation and closing stage.
In structured finance operations, the teams are involved in all phases 
of the process, from organisation, acting as advisers and arrangers and 
assisting the project’s promoters in the drafting of the business plan, 
through to the structuring and underwriting stages, with definition of 
the optimal mix of funding sources.
In securitisation operations, teams are specialised in the management 
of the entire process structuring phase, from detailed analysis of historic 
performances and portfolio composition through to complete manage-
ment of the rating process, which involves the due diligence analysis, 
preparation of the rating book, selection of the portfolio, negotiation 
of credit enhancement levels, and the definition of structural and legal 
characteristics.
In both equity and debt listing operations, teams assist the issuer in 
all phases of the process: from the design of the structure of the offer-
ing in terms of both amount and characteristics, to coordination of the 
offering and investor relation services both during the process, with 
organisation of the road shows and, during the after-market phase, 
with the aim of maximising the value of the issue in the medium-long 
term.
These operators also cover the role of project manager, organising 
and coordinating the work of the entire specific desk: from auditors 
and legal, fiscal, and communications advisers through to professionals 
specialising in management problems.
With regard to breadth of service, Monte dei Paschi di Siena is in an 
intermediate position, since it has the know-how necessary to supply a 
high degree of breadth and depth of service but its relational network 
is currently less broad and it therefore mainly operates at the domestic 
level, and rarely as the leader of a syndicate. Banco Popolare and UBI 
Banca, on the other hand, offer less depth of service, since they have 
more focused operating capabilities, which means that they are not able 
to act as project manager but may take part in one or more phases of the 
process, depending on the type of operation.
In terms of the degree of internationalisation of the offering of cor-
porate and investment banking services, Italian banks operate basically 
at the domestic level. Although all the banks considered have organisa-
tions abroad—varying from highly internationalised positions such as 
that of UniCredit, which has a network of foreign banks in 22 countries, 
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to Monte dei Paschi di Siena, with just a few liaison offices—all the 
services offered in this sector overwhelmingly target the domestic mar-
ket. However, during the last few years three banks, UniCredit, Intesa 
Sanpaolo, and Mediobanca, have launched actions intended to gain 
them a larger role on the international markets. In the capital markets, 
they have increasingly taken part in share- and bond-offering projects. 
In contrast to their leading role on the domestic market, their lower 
profile internationally has meant that they have operated by acquir-
ing mandates within offering consortia. The operations concerned have 
involved offerings by foreign issuers and, in some cases, offerings by 
domestic issuers on foreign markets, such as the Prada initial public 
offering. Internationalisation appears to be very important in view 
of the increasingly globalised, interrelated economic context: since a 
large proportion of corporate and investment banking services concern 
operations of extraordinary significance for firms, the aid of an interna-
tional bank can be highly beneficial. This can apply, for example, to the 
external expansion of a customer corporation through joint venture or 
acquisition processes, to capital fund-raising operations in the markets 
considered most attractive, and to sales—for example, to cover genera-
tional handovers.
It appears likely that internationalisation will further extend the split 
at the heart of the Italian banking system: in general terms, it seems 
that the market will be divided between a small number of institutions 
capable of supplying the full array of corporate and investment bank-
ing services, responding to the opportunities offered by membership 
of an international network, and the rest of the market, which will be 
much more limited and will only be able to supply a small selection 
of advisory services, typical of the merchant banking sector, operat-
ing as originator. Intesa Sanpaolo, UniCredit, and Mediobanca can be 
expected to draw on the experience already acquired to target the large 
corporate and mid-corporate clientele, especially customers with high 
potential for international operations; Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banco 
Popolare, and UBI Banca seem destined to operate solely on the domes-
tic market, serving smaller-sized corporate customers whose financial 
needs are less complex or less linked to internationalisation processes.
Notes
1. A thorough, in-depth analysis of the relationship between small and medi-
um-sized enterprises and the banking system is provided in Caselli (2001). 
There are many diversities within the category of small and medium-sized 
enterprises that are worth examining in greater depth. One possible useful 
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distinction here is the difference between simple and complex enterprises 
suggested by Zara (2007): the former have traditional financial behaviours, 
working mainly with banks on a relationship model, while the financial 
behaviour of the latter is oriented towards a transaction banking model.
2. The 1936 banking law remained substantially unchanged until the mid 1980s, 
which saw the start of the process of banking system reform, which led, in 
August 1993, to the introduction of the new banking law, the Consolidated 
Law on Banking.
3. The information can be obtained from the answers to the following three 
questions: 1) during the current year, did the firm want more loans at the pre-
vailing market conditions? 2) If so, during the year did the firm apply unsuc-
cessfully for more credit? 3) If so, would the firm have agreed to pay a slightly 
higher loan rate to obtain more loans? Firms that replied yes to all three 
questions were considered to have suffered strong rationing, while positive 
replies to the first question were viewed as indicating weak rationing. Firms 
answering yes to the first two questions are defined as suffering from finan-
cial constraint. See UniCredit (2009). tab. 9, p. 126.
4. During 1995–2003 (covered by three surveys), the values averaged around 
16.0% for weak rationing, 4.53% for financial constraints, and 2.8% for 
strong rationing. See Brighi (2009), tab. 2.6, p. 95.
5. Substandard loans are loans to customers suffering from temporary difficul-
ties that are likely to be overcome in a reasonably short time. Restructured 
loans are loans for which a bank, owing to the deterioration in the debtor’s 
financial condition and operating results, accepts changes to the original 
terms and conditions of loans that caused a loss. Overdue/overdrawn loans 
are loans that, at the reference date of the report, have been overdue and 
overdrawn for more than 90 days, secured and unsecured.
6. The market shares of the banks belonging to the main groups fell from 73 
per cent in 1996 to 60 per cent in 2005. See Saccomanni (2006) p. 17. During 
1996 and 2005, the small banks’ market share rose from 24 to 31 per cent. 
See Gobbi (2007), p. 33. Overall, during the two years after the summer 2007 
financial crisis, the five largest groups’ share of the corporate lending market 
fell by more than five percentage points. See Mieli (2009).
7. Operations of this kind include the acquisition by Banca Popolare di Milano 
of Banca Akros, by Banco Popolare of Banca Aletti, by Banca Intesa first by 
Lazard Italia and subsequently, through its merger with Sanpaolo, by Banca 
IMI and by Capitalia (subsequently incorporated into UniCredit) of Medio 
Credito Centrale. UniCredit founded UniCredit Banca Mobiliare and then 
proceeded with further changes to its organisation, while Credem established 
AbaxBank. Acquisitions of specialist merchant banks include, for example, 
those of Centrobanca by Banca Popolare di Bergamo (UBI Banca) and of MPS 
Merchant and Ducato Venture by the Monte dei Paschi di Siena group.
8. At the international level, during the last few years there has been a process 
of acquisition by the large integrated banking groups, for example: Boston 
has joined the Crédit Suisse group, Morgan Grenfell and Banker’s Trust have 
been acquired by the Deutsche Bank group, Shroder has been taken over by 
Citigroup, and more recently Bank of America has acquired Merrill Lynch.
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 9. The most important foreign players include Rothschild, Morgan Stanley, 
Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Lazard, Citi, Credit Suisse, KPMG, BNP 
Paribas, and Royal Bank of Scotland.
10. This even occurs in the case of groups such as BNP Paribas and Crédit 
Agricole, which cover the market through their own banking subsidiaries, 
here Banca Nazionale del Lavoro and CariParma respectively.
11. In the United States, where once there were 17 major investment banks, 
there now are only 5; as of 2011. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley are 
the only investment banks to have survived the financial turbulence as 
independent organisations, and even they have been transformed into 
bank holding companies, which places them under the surveillance of the 
Federal Reserve, allowing them to access its system of advances and loans. 
Bear Stearns was taken over by JPMorgan Chase & Co. at the end of May 
2008, while Merrill Lynch was acquired by Bank of America, in effect from 
the first of January 2009. In September 2008 Lehman Brothers declared 
itself bankrupt and its European and Asian businesses were taken over by 
Nomura, and its North American operations by Barclays.
12. Compared to the banks of other countries, which are more dependent on 
wholesale funding, the Italian banking system enjoys a large supply of retail 
funds that are relatively immune to market volatility. See Banca d’Italia 
(2011a).
